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Foreword
No longer can cybercrime be viewed as an emerging threat, 
for today it is well entrenched in criminal enterprises, has a 
marked impact in everyday crime and is ever present.
The fundamental basis for crime, and even crime types, 
have not changed greatly in the past 20 years, 50 years, 
200 years. Crime is still motivated largely by profit and 
personal gain. What has changed are the tools, the methods 
and the systems used by criminal syndicates to achieve 
their objectives.
Cyber technologies create a new paradigm for the criminal—a 
more sophisticated method to attack the vulnerable—and 
a new fear for the victim. No longer is the evidence of the 
perpetrator visible to their victim. There are no smashed 
windows, broken doors or bones, but the trail of destruction 
can be no less devastating. Technology enables crime to exist 
before the victim is even aware that they’re vulnerable.
Society’s adaptation to the ever increasing world of 
technology provides unlimited potential for convenience, 
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choice, speed and customer satisfaction in the retail world, 
but it provides law enforcement with exponentially greater 
challenges when it comes to ensuring the integrity and safety 
of that online experience.
The technologies that society craves for its freedom, 
its expedience and its social livelihood are the same 
technologies that enable the criminal syndicate to exploit 
vulnerabilities in the network and the human psyche. And 
often from the relative anonymity of a residential basement 
in a town you have barely heard of, let alone been to.
Modern cybercrime draws no distinction between 
government targets, larger corporations and individual users. 
Its sole purpose is to exploit vulnerabilities for gain. Whether 
it is state-based, commercially driven or purely profit-driven 
crime against users, the methods of delivery are the same, 
and the tactics to defeat it must also be the same.
To be successful, law enforcement needs to be as innovative 
as its adversaries. Law enforcement must continue to 
adapt technologies, increase and import skills and enhance 
partnerships—but it must do this at a much faster rate than 
currently occurs.
As a signatory to the Budapest Convention, Australia is 
committed to the principles of achieving efficiency, and 
even harmony, in our laws, our investigation standards and 
methods and our relationships. Cybercrime sees no physical 
or geographical border as a barrier, and law enforcement 
must achieve the same through cooperation and synergy 
across international partnerships.
The two papers in this special report examine the central 
role that cybercrime plays in modern society and how 
technological developments create new opportunities for 
criminals to exploit. Calum Jeffray surveys the strategic 
cybercrime landscape and illustrates that, despite calls for 
law enforcement to ‘do more’ to prevent and investigate 
cybercrime, the agencies involved are often hampered in 
acting due to jurisdictional issues or the complexity of the 
investigations. Tobias Feakin examines the emergence of 
the ‘darknet’, where trading in illicit goods and services in 
online black markets has become increasingly commonplace 
and exacerbates the problems that law enforcement already 
faces—tracing and prosecuting illegal activities online. 
They are essential reading in what is an area of increased 
complexity and importance to fighting crime.
Commissioner Andrew Colvin 
Australian Federal Police
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Caught in the net: the law enforcement 
response to international cybercrime
Calum Jeffray
In late November 2014, Sony Pictures Entertainment 
confirmed that it had been the victim of a cyberattack in 
which large quantities of personal and commercial data—
including employees’ passwords, health-care files and social 
security numbers, as well as actors’ and executives’ salaries—
were either stolen or destroyed. A group calling itself 
‘Guardians of Peace’ claimed responsibility for the attack and 
subsequently issued threats against Sony and film theatres, 
ultimately leading to the cancellation of the premiere of the 
film The interview.
After the North Korean government was accused of being 
responsible for the attack, the situation quickly escalated 
into a major political incident and generated debate about 
the right to free expression and free speech in the digital era. 
What has largely been overlooked, however, is that this was 
one of the most high-profile international cybercrimes ever to 
have been committed. And while the attack has received wide 
condemnation, it’s unlikely that the perpetrators will ever be 
caught or convicted of the crime, particularly if accusations of 
state involvement prove accurate.
Cybercrime can no longer be regarded as an emerging 
threat, but the reality of modern criminality. Today, almost 
all crime has a technological component to it, the numbers 
of internet users and internet-enabled devices continue 
to grow exponentially, and criminals (individuals, groups 
and networks) are able to rapidly exploit this, typically for 
financial gain.
There have been many calls for law enforcement to do more 
to prevent and investigate cybercrime, yet police are often 
hampered in acting because of jurisdictional issues or issues 
inherent in such investigations.1 Unlike most ‘traditional’ 
crimes, cybercrime intersects with multiple jurisdictions 
simultaneously. Even if law enforcement agencies are able to 
trace the origin of an attack to a foreign jurisdiction, there can 
be significant challenges in securing and analysing evidence, 
especially in countries where there may be insufficient 
capacity or ineffective legal tools in place.
The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime—
also known as the Budapest Convention—was the first 
intergovernmental treaty relating to cybercrime and was 
designed to address these challenges, particularly in the 
European context. Although the treaty’s held up as a ‘gold 
standard’ for cybercrime investigation techniques and 
international cooperation, it’s not without its critics. Ten 
years after the convention began to come into force in some 
European countries, this paper explores whether or not 
it continues to provide an effective and practical tool for 
law enforcement agencies, and suggests what more those 
agencies can do to fight global online crime.
Cybercrime: an increasingly sophisticated 
threat
The threat from cybercrime can be generally divided into 
two broad categories. Cyber-dependent crime includes the 
spreading of viruses and other malware, hacking into systems 
and launching distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. 
Cyber-enabled crimes are crimes, such as fraud and money 
laundering, that can be increased in their scale or reach by 
the use of computers, networks or other forms of ICT.2
Despite near-universal agreement that the threat from 
cybercrime is serious and increasing, obstacles remain 
in accurately measuring its scale and impact. While 
there have been a number of attempts to quantify the 
scale of cybercrime, particularly on national levels, their 
methodologies and assumptions are often challenged. The 
optimal method of measuring the impact of cybercrime is 
often disputed; proposed options have included the volume 
of attacks, the volume of data stolen, the value of data stolen, 
the cost of repairing the damage following an attack, and 
so on. The result is a general lack of evidence on the issue 
compared to other criminal activities.
Despite this evidence deficit, analyses of trends suggest 
considerable increases in cybercrime in terms of its scope, 
sophistication, number and types of attacks, number of 
victims, and economic damage. While attacks on well-known 
companies and brands regularly attract the attention of the 
world’s media, much less attention is arguably paid to ‘lower 
level’ cybercrimes committed against individuals. According 
to the Financial Times, ‘Though they might not receive the 
same amount of news coverage, no one should harbour any 
ideas these acts—which range from bank fraud to online child 
sexual exploitation—are any less serious because they are not 
targeted against a large number of people.’3
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Like all types of crime, these acts are committed by both 
opportunistic individuals and organised crime groups, and it 
has become increasingly apparent that specialised expertise 
isn’t a prerequisite for committing cybercrimes. Criminals 
with limited technical competence are able to commit crimes 
online simply by purchasing specialist services, particularly 
as ‘Any kind of cybercrime can be procured even without 
technical skills—password cracking, hacking, tailor-made 
malware or DDoS attacks.’4
Commentators suggest that these highly sophisticated online 
marketplaces operate as fluid ‘transactional’ networks, in 
which criminals offer their services to the highest bidder, 
rather than through allegiance to particular organised crime 
groups. As noted by The Independent, this new breed of 
criminal organisation operates differently from traditional 
hierarchical mafia-style gangs, ‘with a fluid structure of 
specialists often working to order to develop programmes for 
criminal gangs planning specific online scams’.5
The vast majority of cybercrimes are in the pursuit of financial 
gain. While many criminals continue to steal money directly 
(by unlawfully gaining access to online bank accounts, 
for example), it’s increasingly common for them to target 
large volumes of personal and corporate data, which can 
be repeatedly sold on to other criminals via underground 
markets. Recent notorious examples include the theft 
of personal and identification information for 70 million 
customers of US retailer Target in 2013 and the theft of 
56 million customer payment cards from Home Depot in 
2014; in October 2014, the accounts of 76 million JP Morgan 
customers were hacked.6
While cybercriminals will continue to target the networks 
of businesses and large commercial organisations, 
commentators suggest that the sophistication of cybercrimes 
targeting individual users will increase, particularly 
personalised scams. New and popular devices, content 
platforms and payment systems are other likely future 
targets. ‘Criminal hackers tend to attack popular platforms 
where the yield is likely high’, according to internet security 
firm Kaspersky Lab. ‘If no one adopts Apple Pay, then no one 
will target it. However, if Apple Pay is as popular as Apple’s 
other traditional and mobile offerings, then we may be 
writing about Apple Pay hacks sooner rather than later.’7
Other concerns relate to the ways in which criminals are likely 
to exploit social media (malware embedded in Facebook 
videos surfaced in 2014), the anonymity offered by the dark 
web, or the increased number of potential vulnerabilities 
associated with the ‘internet of things’ (some fear that 
criminals will soon be able to hack directly into our homes, 
cars and wearable technology). A final concern is the 
potential role of states, as the boundary between criminal 
and state involvement in particular crimes begins to blur 
(evidenced by the attack on Sony in November).
What these future concerns have in common is that they 
all make it more difficult for law enforcement to identify 
the perpetrators. The attribution problem associated with 
cyberattacks is widely known and well documented, and 
is compounded by the fact that the origin of the attack 
may be overseas. Cybercrime operations often span 
multiple jurisdictions and, as the Sony hack demonstrates, 
the transnational nature of much cybercrime continues 
to present one of the most significant obstacles to law 
enforcement. That said, it’s important to dispel the myth 
that cybercrimes originate only from ‘bad’ countries, since 
anywhere that’s an attractive place to conduct legitimate 
business online also tends to be an environment conducive to 
cybercrime. Countries with sophisticated IT infrastructure—
which is both cheap and easy to use—and global financial and 
logistical hubs are particularly attractive places for criminals 
to launch cyberattacks.
However, such locations are also attractive targets for 
cybercriminals. In its 2014 Internet Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment, the European Cybercrime Centre suggests that 
‘The European Union is a key target for cybercrime because 
of its advanced Internet infrastructure, rates of adoption 
and increasingly Internet-mediated economies and payment 
systems.’8 The assessment goes on to suggest that ‘new 
international strategic and operational partnerships’ will be 
the key to combating future cybercrime threats.9
There are three main reasons why the transnational nature 
of cybercrime creates difficulties for law enforcement. First, 
the level of information exchange and cooperation between 
law enforcement agencies in different countries can be poor. 
Even when dealing with cooperative jurisdictions, slow and 
cumbersome mutual legal assistance treaty processes can 
significantly hamper investigations, and the disproportionate 
effort involved in even modest cases is a constraint in times 
of austerity.10
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Second, the country where the perpetrator is based 
mightn’t have the necessary capacity or sufficient skills and 
knowledge to conduct a suitable investigation, determine the 
source or identity of the perpetrator, or acquire and preserve 
the necessary evidence.
Finally, the country in which the culprit is located may have 
insufficient legislation or legislation that’s incompatible 
with that of the victim’s country, making investigations and 
prosecutions extremely difficult and even impossible in some 
cases. One well-known example is the ‘Love Bug’ computer 
worm that was developed in the Philippines in 2000 and 
reportedly infected millions of computers worldwide. Local 
investigations were hindered by the fact that the malicious 
development and spreading of damaging software was not, 
at the time, adequately criminalised in the Philippines.11
A more coordinated approach: the Budapest 
model
The member states of the EU have a long history of 
cooperation on transnational crime, from setting up the Trevi 
group in 1976 to tackle terrorism and coordinate policing to 
the establishment of the European Police Agency (Europol) 
in 1998. Despite these institutional efforts, the rapid and 
effective cooperation often needed in response to cybercrime 
could still be hampered by the varying legislation within each 
country, as well as the burdensome requirements of mutual 
legal assistance treaties. According to the UN Office on Drugs 
and Crime, a large number of existing treaties are still based 
on ‘formal, complex and often time-consuming procedures. 
The establishment of procedures for quick responses to 
incidents and requests for international cooperation is 
therefore considered vital.’12
One approach to overcoming this problem, improving 
international cooperation and addressing the transnational 
dimension of cybercrime is to develop and standardise 
relevant legislation. Even within the EU, differences in 
legislation and legal instruments to detect, attribute and 
exchange information in relation to cybercrimes cause 
significant impediments, not only to law enforcement per se 
but also to law enforcement agencies’ cooperation with the 
private sector.13
While a number of legal developments have taken place in 
recent years, the Convention on Cybercrime remains the only 
intergovernmental treaty relating to cybercrime. In 1997, 
the Council of Europe appointed the Committee of Experts 
on Crime in Cyberspace to identify and define new crimes, 
jurisdictional rights and criminal liabilities concerning the 
internet.14 In addition to the council’s 47 member countries, 
Canada, Japan, South Africa and the US were invited to 
participate in the discussions as observer nations. As noted 
by one scholar:
The goal was to create a set of standard laws concerning 
cybercrimes for the global community and create a 
common criminal policy to protect against cybercrimes. 
The country representatives sought to make it easier for 
law enforcement to cooperate in collecting evidence in 
investigating computer crimes.15
The first states signed the treaty in November 2001, and 
it began to come into force in July 2004. By January 2015, 
44 nations had ratified the convention, including many 
non-European countries such as Australia, the Dominican 
Republic, Japan and the US.16 Other countries—such as 
Argentina, Egypt, Pakistan and the Philippines—have 
modelled parts of their legislation on the convention without 
formally acceding to it.17
In addition to outlining the use of a common lexicon, the text 
of the convention requires state parties to do the following:18
1. To establish specific types of conduct as criminal offences in 
domestic legislation
Theses offences include, among others, illegal 
access, illegal interception, data interference, system 
interference, misuse of devices, computer-related 
forgery, computer-related fraud, offences related to child 
pornography, and offences related to copyright.
2. To provide criminal justice authorities with effective means 
for investigations
This section outlines procedural law issues, such as the 
search and seizure of computer data, the expedited 
preservation of stored data, and the interception and 
collection of communications data.
3. To engage in efficient international police and judicial 
cooperation
This section relates mainly to parties providing 
real-time assistance to one another, including points of 
contact available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. It also 
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requires parties to ensure that their law enforcement 
responders are properly trained and equipped, and 
provide appropriate technical assistance to others 
when necessary.
One of the biggest perceived successes of the convention 
is that it exists in the first place. Given the multitude of 
perspectives of the vast number of stakeholders involved 
(particularly non-state actors), the negotiation of treaties 
relating to cybersecurity is notoriously challenging. As 
one commentator has noted, the internet and ICT sector 
today involves such a large number of stakeholders that 
‘it would seem very difficult to bring all interests under 
an international agreement of the scope and depth of the 
Budapest Convention.’19
Ten years after the convention was signed, Thorbjørn 
Jagland, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, praised 
the success of the treaty and claimed that:
The convention has proven to work. Thanks to it, 
there has been a broad harmonisation of cybercrime 
legislation, not only in Europe but worldwide. In addition, 
offences such as illegal access to computer data or illegal 
interception of computer data or computer-related 
forgery or fraud, have been criminalised.20
There’s also evidence of increased cooperation at the 
operational level, particularly in the context of Europol, which 
launched the European Cybercrime Centre in January 2013 
and its Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce in September 
2014. This has allowed for the coordination of international 
investigations into some of the most serious cybercrime 
threats of recent years. Three of the largest investigations are 
detailed below.
Operation Tovar
In May 2014, 10 national law enforcement agencies took part 
in an operation to disrupt the Gameover Zeus botnet and 
seize computer servers crucial to malicious CryptoLocker 
software. Gameover Zeus was a sophisticated type of 
malware designed to steal banking and other credentials 
from the computers it infected, which was then used to 
transfer money to accounts controlled by the criminals. 
More than a million computers worldwide were infected 
by the malware.21 The infected computers also distributed 
ransomware known as CryptoLocker, which encrypted all 
files on the victim’s computer until a ransom was paid to 
buy the password necessary to unlock the files. After the law 
enforcement agencies disrupted the criminal infrastructure 
by taking control of the domains and arresting a suspect from 
Anapa in Russia, the then head of the European Cybercrime 
Centre, Troels Oerting, said, ‘This big, and very successful, 
operation has been an important test of the EU Member 
States’ ability to act fast, decisively and coordinated against a 
dangerous criminal network.’22
Remote access Trojans
In November 2014, Europol and several law enforcement 
and judicial authorities carried out actions against EU 
citizens suspected of using remote access Trojans (RATs). 
RATs are malware used to spy on victims’ computers and 
access personal information, record on-screen, webcam and 
microphone activity, and collect passwords or credit card 
details. Fifteen people were arrested in several European 
countries, including France, Romania, Latvia, Italy and the 
UK. Troels Oerting once again attributed the success of the 
operation to ‘an alliance of EU law enforcement agencies’ 
joining forces, allowing them to collate intelligence, analyse 
collective data to identify the perpetrators, and coordinate 
action and arrests.23
Operation Onymous
Also in November 2014, representatives from the law 
enforcement agencies of 17 countries gathered at Europol 
to collaborate on one of the biggest operations against 
dark-web websites. The action aimed to stop the sale, 
distribution and promotion of illegal and harmful items, 
including weapons and drugs, sold in online ‘dark’ 
marketplaces. The primary target was the notorious Silk 
Road 2.0 site, although an additional 413 illicit services were 
reported to have been shut down. Recognising the way that 
criminals use the dark web and ‘hide behind international 
borders so they can stymie law enforcement’, US Assistant 
Attorney-General Leslie Caldwell praised the way ‘the global 
law enforcement community has innovated and collaborated 
to disrupt these “dark market” websites’.24
National to global: addressing vulnerabilities
While cooperation between countries may have improved 
since the Budapest Convention first came into force a decade 
ago, and there have been operational successes, Europol 
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recognises that a number of shortcomings remain in the 
approach of European law enforcement to cybercrime:
EU law enforcement, Europol included, has not fully 
conceptualised how to integrate this cyber dimension 
into all relevant aspects of police work, let alone devise a 
strategy and implementation plan to make this happen.25
Not all these shortcomings can be blamed on the Budapest 
Convention, although the agreement continues to attract its 
critics, particularly those who believe it to be a largely 
‘symbolic’ treaty, likely to have only a ‘limited effect on 
cybercrime in the long-term’.26
One reason for this criticism has been that ratification or 
accession to the convention has been slower than expected. 
In some countries, the treaty has come into force only 
recently, while some key European nations—Greece, Ireland 
and Sweden—have yet to ratify it. While recognising that 
‘[t]he impact of the Convention on Cybercrime cannot be 
measured solely by the number of States that have signed 
or ratified the Convention’, the UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime noted in 2010 that ‘compared to global standards, the 
number and speed of signature and ratification certainly 
remains an issue’.27 This delay may be due in part to the time 
needed to implement the appropriate legislative measures, 
since all provisions within the convention are required to be 
reflected in domestic legislation by the time of ratification 
or accession.
Even though the treaty outlines specific laws that need to 
be passed, there may also be inconsistencies from country 
to country in how those laws are written and applied. This 
This photo provided by the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice on 13 February 2014 shows weapons and ammunition purchased by 
undercover police. Five men have been arrested in Germany and the Netherlands in a sting operation against a website allegedly used to sell 
illegal drugs and weapons © AP via AAP/Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice. 
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is particularly true in relation to laws about the interception 
and retention of communications data for the purposes 
of law enforcement—a topic that remains controversial in 
much of Europe. From the perspective of law enforcement, 
the limits currently placed on how much data can be held 
and for how long mean that police cannot effectively trace 
and prosecute criminals. Europol’s Internet Organised Crime 
Threat Assessment claims that:
Current data retention laws are insufficient for law 
enforcement. The majority of intelligence and evidence 
for cyber investigations comes from private industry. 
With no data retention, there can be no attribution 
and therefore no prosecutions. In this context a new 
EU Directive on data retention following the European 
Court of Justice’s annulment of the existing measure is 
urgently required.
Critics, however, argue that extending the powers of law 
enforcement agencies in this area would unnecessarily 
intrude upon the privacy of citizens.
A final criticism is that membership of the treaty is confined 
to EU members and selected others, which limits the 
effectiveness of efforts to improve international cooperation. 
A number of important countries haven’t signed or ratified 
the convention, including countries with some of the 
highest cybercrime rates in the world, such as Russia, China, 
India and Brazil. This has led the CEO of Kaspersky Lab to 
describe the Budapest Convention as a ‘convention of the 
victim countries’.28 Because the treaty was prepared by the 
Council of Europe and not by, say, the UN, it’s also difficult to 
persuade some countries to now join the treaty. Experience 
has shown that, regardless of the subject, states are generally 
reluctant to ratify or accede to conventions that they haven’t 
contributed to developing or negotiating.29
Not all the challenges for law enforcement derive from the 
Budapest Convention, and political and legal agreements can 
only go so far in supporting law enforcement in combating 
the threat from cybercrime. Many of the most significant 
challenges for agencies in relation to cybercrime involve 
problems of capacity, process and even cultural mindset at 
the national and subnational levels.
Information sharing and, in particular, the real-time 
exchange of information between agencies remain an 
ongoing challenge. Effective data sharing is becoming more 
critical than ever, given the speed at which cybercrime 
can occur. As noted by the Financial Times, while there 
are plenty of proposals for information exchange on 
cybercrime under discussion, ‘they now need to be 
implemented so that all those involved have effective and 
sustainable systems for sharing large volumes of data across 
organisational boundaries’.30
Taking into account the complexity of the issue and constant 
developments in technology, there’s a continuing need for 
sustained recruitment of specialists and ongoing training 
for law enforcement officers involved in investigations. In 
November 2014, the inspectorate responsible for assessing 
police forces in England and Wales found that ‘the gap 
between the threat and police capability is widening’.31 It 
concluded that police are ‘falling behind the curve of rapidly 
changing criminality’ because of a ‘deficit in the skill and 
experience of the investigating officers’. 32 It suggested that 
one of the reasons for this is that law enforcement agencies 
are struggling to recruit enough high-calibre technology 
experts—many of whom are able to command higher salaries 
in the private sector—and called for a fundamental rethink on 
police recruitment to tackle cybercrime.
Rob Wainwright, Director of Europol, has suggested that 
‘Across the board in Europe, the police are really struggling 
to get the right guys through the doors because they can’t 
afford to pay the rates that criminals and the tech guys do’, 
admitting that ‘We’re not getting the right people and there’s 
not enough training of existing cops.’33
Given that most crimes now have a technological component, 
and the number of ‘low-level’ cybercrimes affecting the 
public at large will only increase in future, tackling cybercrime 
should be the responsibility of all officers, rather than a 
select few. In the context of new forms of online abuse, the 
use of digital currencies and the consumption of radical 
and extreme content, for example, police officers need to 
be trained to understand these emerging crimes and to 
distinguish between cases that require police attention and 
those that don’t.34 To both disrupt and prevent cybercrime, 
significant changes may be needed in the working culture of 
some police forces to see beyond traditional (and of course 
national) boundaries. In the light of the report on policing in 
England and Wales, for example, The Independent reported 
on the changes needed to the ‘tribal’ behaviour of different 
forces, in which ‘police and agencies [are] protecting their 
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own sources and techniques in a fractured response to 
an area of crime that has been identified as a key national 
security threat’.35
Finally, wider public perceptions of cybercrime need to 
be addressed. In particular, the scale of under-reporting 
of cybercrimes remains considerable. According to the UK 
Home Office, just under 1% of adult internet users report 
unauthorised access to their data to the police, while 
businesses report just under 2% of online incidents. Part 
of the reason for such low levels of reporting is likely to be 
the victims’ belief that there’s little that the police could or 
would do.36 A further consequence of under-reporting is that 
cybercrimes don’t commonly feature among national crime 
statistics; where such data is available, it’s often not detailed 
enough to provide reliable information about the scale or 
extent of offences.37
National capabilities for international efforts
In countries such as the UK, it’s increasingly recognised 
that cybercrime is not an emerging threat but the reality of 
crime now, and that forces need to adapt quickly to meet 
the threat.38 Given the inherently transnational nature of 
cybercrimes and the complexities involved in investigating 
them, coordination and cooperation between law 
enforcement agencies operating in different jurisdictions 
are crucial. The ratification of the Budapest Convention by 
many countries has certainly helped them in this regard 
and has paved the way for increased institutional capacity, 
particularly within Europol.
However, agreements such as the convention can only 
go so far in combating international cybercrime. At the 
national level, more needs to be done to understand 
the scale of the problem in each country by encouraging 
individuals and businesses to report cybercrimes, as well 
as by improving the recording of such crimes. Given the 
pace of technological change and continual increases in the 
sophistication of criminal attacks, law enforcement agencies 
must also possess the necessary capabilities, skilled officers 
and expertise and provide ongoing training to fulfil the 
obligations laid out in the Budapest Convention. To do so, 
they must recognise the cultural changes they must make in 
their organisations to address such a rapidly changing threat 
as cybercrime.
As the recent attack on Sony reminds us, international 
cybercrime is an important strategic issue. Responding to 
such an attack (particularly if it involves state collusion) 
is extremely difficult for law enforcement agencies. 
There’s potential for cross-border cooperation through 
the framework of the Budapest Convention, but better 
coordination at the international level shouldn’t be to the 
detriment of ensuring that national capabilities are sufficient 
to address the threat. There’s still much that can be done 
at the national and subnational levels to ensure that law 
enforcement agencies are able to work jointly with their 
counterparts overseas more effectively. Without these 
national building blocks in place, cybercriminals, such as 
those who launched the attack on Sony, are likely to continue 
to slip through the net.
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Cryptomarkets—illicit goods in the darknet
Tobias Feakin
An environment such as cyberspace, where possible gains are 
high, the probability of capture is low and deniability rules, 
is a highly attractive medium for the whole range of threat 
actors. Nowhere is this exemplified more potently than in 
the ‘darknet’—a part of the ‘deep web’1, where content isn’t 
accessible through traditional search engines such as Google 
and where access is anonymous and largely untraceable. 
In the darknet, trading in illicit goods and services in online 
black markets has become increasingly commonplace and 
exacerbates the problems that law enforcement already faces 
in tracing and prosecuting illegal activities online.
This paper examines the growth of cryptomarkets in the 
darknet, the current and future challenges that they present 
for law enforcement agencies, and measures that the 
agencies could take to improve law enforcement responses.
The end of the beginning—the Silk Road 
take‑down
In October 2013, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) was celebrating the arrest of Ross Ulbricht (alias ‘Dread 
Pirate Roberts’) and the take-down of his online marketplace, 
Silk Road. He was believed to have amassed around 
US$80 million from Silk Road, where people bought a range 
of legal and illegal goods and data, such as drugs, ‘exploit’ 
software kits, credit card details and fake identification. 
However, despite the taking down of Silk Road, the past 
year has produced a larger problem: a diversification of 
cryptomarkets that are expanding to meet the demand of an 
ever increasing clientele.
Publicity about the take-down of Silk Road caused some 
of that growth, but so did the cryptomarkets’ mimicking of 
legal e-commerce sites such as eBay and Amazon, where 
convenience, product choice, price and peer review play a 
Silk Road, the best-known underground marketplace for the trade of illegal drugs on the internet has been closed by the US authorities after an 
arrest of Ross William Ulbricht, alleged to be the owner of the site, screengrab 3 October 2013 © David Colbran/Demotix/Corbis.
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large role. In July 2014, the BBC reported that listings of illegal 
drugs online in the darknet had more than doubled from 
the previous year.2 In October 2013, there were 18,174 drug 
listings in four major markets; by 31 July 2014, there were 
43,175 in 23 markets. Three of the largest markets were 
Silk Road 2.0 (largely based on its predecessor), Agora and 
Evolution, each of which had more listings than the original 
Silk Road did at the time of its demise.3
Those three markets all ban child pornography, but their 
other operating principles vary greatly. Silk Road 2.0 focused 
on drugs, while Agora also sells weapons. However, the 
fastest growing of all is Evolution, which has the loosest 
restrictions and advertises guns, stolen credit-card 
data, stolen medical information and fake identification. 
Evolution’s popularity has been driven not only by its amoral 
approach compared with the original Silk Road, which had 
a strict libertarian ethos, but also by its more professional 
operation and its offer of more secure transactions. One 
security feature that separates it from its competition is a 
bitcoin payment feature called ‘multi-signature transactions’. 
When a purchase is made, users deposit their bitcoins in 
an escrow account created by Evolution. The account is 
controlled by Evolution’s administrators, the buyer and 
the seller. At least two of the three must authorise the 
transaction before the payment is made. This means that it’s 
far more difficult for the bitcoins to be stolen or be seized by 
law enforcement officials. To add to the difficulties for law 
enforcement and the appeal for users, the site also provides 
encryption when logging on, when activated users are 
required to decrypt a message with a private Pretty Good 
Privacy (PGP) key.4
However, these markets aren’t the most malicious parts 
of the darknet. There are genuine concerns that the 
darknet provides a haven for dealers in child pornography, 
contract killers, human traffickers, terrorists and sellers 
of state secrets. One alarming study from the University 
of Portsmouth stated that, even though drug forums and 
contraband markets are the largest single category of sites 
hidden in the darknet, traffic to those sites is dwarfed by visits 
to child pornography sites. Four out of five visits to hidden 
services sites were to sites holding paedophilic content.5
A recent RAND report examined the growth of activity in such 
marketplaces and concluded not only that black markets are 
growing in size and complexity, but that the hacker market in 
particular had developed considerably over the past 20 years:
The hacker market—once a varied landscape of discrete, 
ad hoc networks of individuals initially motivated by 
little more than ego and notoriety—has emerged as a 
playground of financially driven, highly organized, and 
sophisticated groups. In certain respects, the black 
market can be more profitable than the illegal drug trade; 
the links to end-users are more direct, and because 
worldwide distribution is accomplished electronically, the 
requirements are negligible.6
The report noted how resilient these black markets had 
become after law enforcement actions, which had led to 
higher levels of encryption and more rigorous and aggressive 
vetting of individuals. This means that law enforcement 
agents attempting to infiltrate these groups (a common 
tactic in the past) will find such attempts more challenging in 
the future.
Anonymity online—the Tor browser
The key to these activities is the relative anonymity that 
users have when accessing the darknet using via browsers 
such as Tor (The Onion Router, known by that name because 
of the layers of encryption that surround and obscure the 
data being passed back and forth when it’s used). The 
genesis of Tor was in the research of three US Naval Research 
Laboratory scientists. As late as 2011, the US Government 
supplied 60% of its funding, and Google supports the 
non-profit organisation that administers it.7 There are 
plenty of reasons why the US Government would fund such 
a tool: military and intelligence agencies could use it for 
covert communications, and police could use it to receive 
anonymous tips and investigate illegal online activities 
without alerting the targets. It has also provided an avenue 
for dissidents and journalists living under authoritarian 
regimes to speak out and communicate with others beyond 
their borders.8
The ability to browse illegal goods anonymously and the 
growth in cryptocurrencies that allow relatively anonymous 
payment for those goods make it hard for law enforcement 
to keep up. Bitcoin have been the most well-known 
cryptocurrency, but is now becoming passé. New currencies, 
such as Zerocash, which claims to be a privacy-preserving 
version of its predecessor, are increasing the headache for 
hi-tech crime units around the world.9
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Law enforcement fights back
As evidenced since the Silk Road take-down, police have a 
real problem on their hands. As soon as the authorities shut 
down cryptomarkets, they reappear in another place, with 
stronger vetting of users and greater encryption capabilities. 
However, police have had some wins.
In February 2014, Dutch and German police shut down 
Utopia, a similar darknet site, as part of Operation 
Commodore. Utopia had been used to trade drugs, stolen 
credit cards, weapons and a host of other illegal goods. The 
site was up and running for only nine days, but in that time 
there were around 13,000 listings, many offering global 
postage services—illustrating how popular such sites have 
become. Police made five arrests and confiscated firearms 
and 900 bitcoins, which were worth about US$610,900 at the 
time.10 The message from the authorities was clear: ‘You are 
not untouchable using the Tor browser and the darknet.’
The most recent high-profile law enforcement action taken in 
the darknet, and the largest ever carried out, was Operation 
Onymous. The operation’s most prominent target was Silk 
Road 2.0, but it was reported to have taken down more than 
400 other illicit services based on the Tor network. The 
operation was conducted by the US FBI, the UK National 
Crime Agency and 15 other nations’ law enforcement 
agencies. Seventeen arrests were made in sixteen countries, 
including of the alleged head of Silk Road 2.0, Blake Benthall. 
The authorities seized US$1 million worth of bitcoin, as well 
as drugs, guns and large amounts of cash.11
Bavarian Criminal Investigation Department employee holds a 
seized envelope and amphetamins (speed) in Munich, Germany, 
9 July 2013. Investigators were able to arrest a group which had 
specialized in trading drugs via darknets © Tobias Hase/dpa/Corbis.
After the initial reports of more than 400 take-downs, the 
numbers became confused. According to Europol, the 
European Union’s law enforcement agency, ‘upwards of 50’ 
sites were disrupted, and the FBI would only publicly confirm 
the closing of 27 markets.
Whatever the numbers, the operation closed some significant 
markets, including the following:
• Silk Road 2.0, Pandora, Blue Sky, Hydra and Cloud Nine, 
all of which were black markets offering a range of illegal 
goods and services including drugs, stolen credit-card 
data, counterfeit currency and fake identity documents
• Executive Outcomes, which specialised in firearms 
(including assault rifles, automatic weapons and sound 
suppressors) and stated that it used secure drop-ship 
locations throughout the world so that anonymity was 
ensured throughout the shipping process and that all 
serial numbers from the weapons it sold were removed 
and refilled with metal
• Fake Real Plastic, which offered to sell counterfeit credit 
cards, encoded with ‘stolen credit card data’ and ‘printed 
to look just like real VISA and Mastercards’; the cards were 
guaranteed to have at least $2,500 left on the credit card 
limit and could be embossed with ‘any name you want on 
the card’
• Fake ID, which offered fake passports from a number 
of countries, advertised as high quality and having all 
the security features of original documents, and which 
advertised its ability to ‘affix almost all kind of stamps 
into the passports’
• Fast Cash! and Super Notes Counter, which offered to sell 
counterfeit euros and US dollars in exchange for bitcoin.12
Within hours of the operation being announced, a Silk 
Road 3.0 site appeared via the Tor network, showing just 
how quickly those involved in these cryptomarkets can 
re-establish themselves after aggressive police action. 
Their speed and agility pose a serious problem for law 
enforcement. The scope of the problem shouldn’t be 
underestimated, as some markets that are still trading, 
such as Agora and Evolution, will soon outsize the Silk 
Road franchise, and the money to be made means that 
other competitors are bound to emerge in the near future. 
The number of people trading in these markets also poses 
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a capacity problem for law enforcement. For example, it 
was found during the trial of Ross Ulbricht, the owner of 
the original Silk Road site, that between 6 February 2011 
and 23 July 2013 there had been 1,229,465 completed 
transactions, involving 146,946 buyer accounts and 
3,877 vendor accounts.13
What can law enforcement do?
For law enforcement agencies, cybercrime is a significant 
and complex national, human and economic security 
challenge. Their response must often be multijurisdictional, 
demanding close collaboration with international and 
domestic partners. Criminal elements can split and merge, 
reshape and reprioritise, and move or disperse at will. 
Government agencies don’t have that flexibility and can 
often be held up by their own structures and agreed-upon 
areas of responsibility. There’s no doubt that the complexity, 
sophistication and impact of cybercrime are growing, so 
there’s an onus on law enforcement agencies to respond and 
at least keep pace with the criminals.
The problems that law enforcement agencies face in the 
darknet are an amplification of problems that they face in 
the broader cybercrime area. They already struggle with 
the relative anonymity of the online world, and Tor and 
the darknet further obscure who the actors are and where 
they’re based.
In many respects, the agencies are playing catch-up in 
multiple areas, especially in trying to apply laws that 
aren’t nationally or internationally tailored to combating 
cybercrime. However, there are three key ways that they can 
increase their capabilities:
• Invest in technology. It’s vital that agencies’ technology is 
the best available and is kept up to date. Cybercriminals 
are well funded, can invest in the latest technologies and 
can quickly bring them into operation, while government 
agencies struggle to purchase and absorb new 
technology quickly enough for it to give them an edge. 
This clearly needs to change. Agencies need to include 
some technology forecasting in their analytical and 
strategy work, and they should reach out to the private 
sector in order to understand the latest technical trends.
• Build a sustainable skills base. Advances in technology 
occur quite independently of users, who can get access to 
the most advanced software but be completely oblivious 
to it and the advantages it could bring. Combating 
cybercrime will become as difficult as the best software 
engineers can make it, so without an appropriate skills 
base it will be impossible for law enforcement to be 
able to respond. Training should be a central part of any 
agency’s strategy, and upskilling its members so that all 
are ‘cybersavvy’ is essential. The agencies need to aim 
to recruit, develop and retain staff with specialist skills 
and create clear career paths for those staff within their 
organisations. This should include innovative schemes 
for international placements and secondments into the 
private sector in order to understand problems from 
multiple angles.
• Build international partnerships. Most cybercrimes, 
including those using Tor, the darknet and the illicit 
markets found there, involve linkages across international 
boundaries. Therefore, countering them requires 
increased international cooperation and coordination 
between the agencies involved. In the case of Operation 
Onymous, the US Justice Department stated:
It is a plain fact that criminals use advanced 
technology to commit their crimes and conceal 
evidence—and they hide behind international borders 
so they can stymie law enforcement … But the global 
law enforcement community has innovated and 
collaborated to disrupt these ‘dark market’ websites, 




Because one of the most potent ways to respond to 
cybercrime is through international cooperation and 
legislative alignment between nations, there are distinct 
challenges in the Asia–Pacific region, and subsequently for 
Australia. The level of cybercrime is likely to continue growing 
in the region because of three factors: the economic growth 
of the region as a whole, the growth in internet penetration 
in the region, and the disparities in legislative approaches 
and capability and capacity in the region. For example, a 
recent ASPI report examining cyber maturity in the Asia–
Pacific found that Australia, Japan and South Korea all have 
well-developed legislation and law enforcement capabilities, 
whereas nations such as Papua New Guinea, Cambodia 
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and Myanmar are still in the early stages of developing their 
cybercrime legislation and capabilities.15 This means that 
as cybercrime continues on an upward trajectory there’s 
an urgent need to help less developed nations reach an 
adequate level of capability.
Nations in the region will increasingly be targets for criminal 
activity as criminals follow emerging sources of income 
and seek out legislative settings that are less likely to lead 
to their arrest and conviction. There’s clear motivation for 
Asia–Pacific nations to coordinate their efforts to combat 
cybercrime, but there are difficulties in making that a reality.
From the legal and operational standpoints, signatories to 
the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime are at an 
advantage. The convention harmonises legal and operational 
frameworks, which makes transboundary coordination and 
convictions much easier.16 However, there are only three 
signatories in the Asia–Pacific (Australia, Japan and the US), 
which makes wider coordination much more difficult. It 
would be logical for nations in the region to at least align their 
legislative settings with those in the convention. Many have 
begun to do so, but others have inadequate laws, ineffective 
law enforcement or both, and risk becoming safe havens for 
cybercriminals or sites for infrastructure used for cybercrime.
Two further barriers stand in the way of deeper regional 
cooperation on cybercrime. First, some nations in the region, 
most prominently China, are ideologically opposed to the 
Convention on Cybercrime because they see it as a construct 
of European nations and European vested interests, and 
because they weren’t involved in its development. Second, 
the utility of cybercrime as a proxy for pursuing state goals 
could also limit the scope of any agreement and compliance 
with it.17
This means that Australian law enforcement has to work 
mainly on a bilateral basis on specific cases, negotiating 
coordination case by case, which slows down investigations 
and subsequent prosecutions. Australia has worked hard in 
this area, with some success (for example, in Indonesia, the 
Australian Federal Police has helped to establish a Cyber 
Crime Investigation Centre and several associated cyber 
units).18 However, that success isn’t being replicated across 
the rest of the region, so cybercrime investigations remain 
enormously problematic.
Getting ahead of the game
It’s a certainty that malicious darknet activity and 
cryptomarkets will continue along their current 
trajectory and increase in size and scope. The benefits for 
cybercriminals far outweigh the costs, and the increased 
use of encryption and vetting of those people using darknet 
services create a blanket of security that law enforcement will 
have to again break through. What has been proven through 
recent law enforcement take-downs is that the developers 
of these sites, the vendors of illicit goods and the technology 
itself are resilient to law enforcement efforts. Far from being 
put off by police actions, users are increasingly attracted to 
the darknet as a result of publicity about those actions.
If law enforcement doesn’t innovate and keep up with 
and occasionally overtake emerging trends, it will lag 
behind cybercriminals.
Government policymakers would do well to set the policy 
wheels in motion quickly, in an effort to keep up with or 
overtake the criminals. It’s no good being purely reactive in 
such a rapidly evolving space.
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